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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT: DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION REVISITED
BRUCE A. HARRIS* AND ROBERT CORY SCHNEPPER**
Several commentators have maintained that the federal
courts have taken confusing and inconsistent positions with re-
gard to the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The authors attempt to refute this position by ana-
lyzing more recent opinions and finding a trend. This trend has
led to a less confusing and more definite framework depending
upon various factors which will appear in every case. By analyz-
ing these factors while keeping in mind the purposes of both the
Act and the exception, the authors conclude that the outcome of
any dispute in this area will be susceptible to a higher degree of
predictability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Originally enacted in 1946, the Federal Tort Claims Act' allows
monetary recovery against the United States government' for dam-
* Former Senior Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review;
Naturalization Examiner, United States Immigration & Naturalization Service.
** Former Member, University of Miami Law Review; Associated with Ser, Keyfetz,
De Cardenas & Levine, Miami, Florida.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1970).
2. All claims initially must be presented to the appropriate federal agency for a decision
on liability. If the claim has been "finally denied" by the agency, the dissatisfied claimant
may seek court review.
Under the original Act the heads of each federal agency could consider, adjust, and
determine any claims for damages only when such damages were under a certain amount.
Today, no court action can be maintained unless the claimant has first presented his claim
to the federal agency and the claim has been formally denied. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2675 (1970).
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ages, loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by negligent
or wrongful acts of federal government employees' while acting
within the scope of their employment.' The doctrine of sovereign
immunity,' as acknowledged by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens
v. Virginia,' previously had barred recovery in tort actions against
the government.7 The United States cannot be sued without its
consent.' This doctrine, imported from England, sought to prevent
interference by the judiciary with the performance of ordinary gov-
ernmental functions.'
The Tort Claims Act is intended to waive "the Government's
traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to es-
tablish novel and unprecedented governmental liability."," Con-
gress recognized the desirability of spreading among all taxpayers
losses suffered through negligent acts rather than imposing the en-
tire burden on the injured party." However, a section of the Act,
presently 28 U.S.C. section 2680(a) (1970), expressly excepts from
the Act's coverage
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a fed-
eral agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.
Thus, when a government official is exercising a "discretionary
function," no tort suit can be maintained; the government has not
3. Liability of the United States in tort is "in the same manner and extent as a private
individual under like circumstances," but no liability exists for "interest prior to judgment
or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970) (emphasis added). District courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
4. "The statute is unique in Anglo-American jurisprudence in its explicit exception for
discretion." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32-33 n. 27 (1953).
5. For a discussion of this doctrine, gee Cramton, Non.statutory Review of Federal Ad-
ministrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Soverign Immunity, Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant. 68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 396-436 (1970).
6. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).
7. To waive immunity, Congress has passed statutes in several areas of law to allow suits
against the government. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
8. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821).
9. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
10. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957).
11. Id. at 319-20.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
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consented to being sued; and the doctrine of sovereign immunity
applies. 3 An unresolved question, however, remains: Which discre-
tionary acts were immunized by Congress? Since government agen-
cies are engaged in different types of activities, the federal courts
encountered problems and confusion in attempting to construe and
apply section 2680(a).14 The courts have not construed the exception
as applying to all discretionary acts of the government. 5 Several
recent federal cases have demonstrated a wide variety of situations
which face the courts when applying the exception. Judicial scru-
tiny of an assortment of discretionary governmental activities has
occurred in such instances as where: (1) the chief FBI agent at the
scene of a hijacking ordered his agents to open fire to disable the
plane, but this order also resulted in the hijacker's response of shoot-
ing two hostages;" (2) through an allegedly negligent application by
an HEW division of scientific standards promulgated in certain
Surgeon General regulations, a plaintiff sustained injuries from
ingestion of Sabin oral live-virus polio vaccine; 7 (3) the NLRB de-
layed for 4 years the initial back pay specifications against an em-
ployer following an enforcement order by the court of the Board's
reinstatement order since this work was assigned to an inexperi-
enced officer who was instructed to handle less complicated matters
first; 8 and (4) a government agency awarded a contract by deter-
mining that the lowest bidder had complied with the specific bid
invitation requirements. 9
13. Analogously, immunity has been extended to protect government officials sued in
their individual capacity for discretionary activities undertaken as part of their official duties.
"The doctrine of immunity [also] reflects the view that an official may be excessively
hampered if he is subject to the tedious and potentially embarrassing process of litigation,
regardless of the ultimate outcome." Estrada v. Hill, 401 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Il1. 1975),
quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
14. Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57
GEO. L.J. 81 (1968); Comment, Discretionary Function Exception to Federal Tort Liability,
2 CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV. 383 (1971).
15. Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585, 596 (5th Cir. 1973), quoting Smith
v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
16. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975); see text accompanying notes
78-81 infra.
17. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974); see text accompanying notes
143-46 infra.
18. J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976); see text accompanying note 111 infra.
19. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910 (1976); see text accompanying notes 91-93 infra.
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The cases which have proceeded to litigation thus far demon-
strate that the determination of which activities constitute discre-
tionary functions within the exception is by no means obvious.
Standards applied by courts have contained specious distinctions.
It is maintained, and the writers intend to show, that the confusion
in the past among the courts has been replaced in these and other
recent opinions with the development of a more consistent approach
based primarily upon whether the decisionmaking process encom-
passed policy considerations."
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The language of the exception2' has not provided standards for
its application. In order to consider the original intent of Congress,
courts have searched the rather inconclusive legislative history of
the Act.
Despite this lack, the courts and commentators have been in
general agreement as to the purpose of the Act. The Federal Tort
Claims Act was enacted by Congress as Title IV of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 19463 in an effort to relieve itself of the mas-
sive number of private relief bills which were presented before each
session. 4 These burdensome bills, by unduly occupying congres-
20. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
21. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
22. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953); L. JAYSON, HANDLING
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES, chs. 2, 12 (1974); Reynolds,
supra note 14, at 81-85.
23. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-24, 60 Stat. 842.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) noted the magnitude of the task
of disposing of private claims:
In the Sixty-eighth Congress about 2,200 private claim bills were introduced,
of which 250 became law, then the largest number in the history of the Claims
Committee.
In the Seventieth Congress 2,268 private claim bills were introduced, asking
more than $100,000,000. Of these, 336 were enacted, appropriating about
$2,830,000, of which 144, in the amount of $562,000, were for tort.
In each of the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Congresses over 2,300 private
claim bills were introduced, seeking more than $100,000,000. In the Seventy-sixth
Congress approximately 2,000 bills were introduced, of which 315 were approved,
for a total of $826,000.
In the Seventy-seventh Congress, of the 1,829 private claim bills introduced
and referred to the Claims Committee, 593 were approved for a total of
$1,000,253.30. In the Seventy-eighth Congress 1,644 bills were introduced; 549 of
these were approved for a total of $1,355,767.12. So far during the present Con-
gress about 1,279 private claim bills have been introduced. Of these, 225 have
been enacted, appropriating about $965,353.06.
[Vol. 31:161
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
sional time, hindered Congress' attempts to legislate in areas of
more vital national concern.25 A more simplified recovery procedure
was needed. Furthermore, the vehicle of private bills for relief acted
to prejudice the claims of applicants."6 Consequently, Title IV was
enacted, although not without opposition,27 to provide for the ad-
ministrative and judicial adjustment of tort claims against the fed-
eral government.
Since 1925,5 legislation waiving the government's sovereign
immunity in tort had been introduced for congressional considera-
tion. Congress had previously passed several statutes whereby the
government had consented to suits in such areas as breach of con-
tract, patent infringement, and maritime torts. 9 Each bill proposed
various methods of granting relief to tort claimants.'" The earlier
tort claims bills contained rather specific reservations from the
25. 92 CONG. REC. 10048 (1946) (remarks of Representative Michener, quoting a part of
the committee report).
26. Statement of Estes Kefauver, Hearings Before Joint Comm. on the Organization of
Congress Pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 68 (1945).
Mr. Kefauver indicated that the Senate as a whole, with its increased workload, gave
little consideration to private relief bills. Legitimate claims would encounter difficulties
unless political sponsors for the relief bill could be found.
27. 92 CONG. REC. 10048 (1946) (remarks of Representative Michener quoting a part of
the committee report).
Opponents of the bill feared that Congress was opening the floodgates to fraudulent suits
against the government. See 92 CONG. REC. 6372-73 (1946) (remarks of Senator George).
Furthermore, they saw Congress as abdicating its responsibility by giving away the taxpayer's
money.
28. Act of March 3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1112 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1970)).
29. H.R. REP. No. 1287, supra note 24, at 2-3.
30. In H.R. REP. No. 1287, supra note 24, the House pointed out the numerous bills
which had been introduced to waive governmental immunity in tort claims.
For many years bills on this subject have been introduced from time to time
attempting to approach the matter in various ways. During the Seventieth Con-
gress a bill, H.R. 9285, which endeavored to deal with this matter passed both
Houses but encountered a pocket veto at the hands of President Coolidge, which
it is understood was principally based on the fact that the function of acting as
counsel for the Government in such cases was to be reposed by that bill in the
Comptroller General instead of in the Attorney General.
In the Seventy-sixth Congress H.R. 7236 passed the House on September 12,
1940, but the pressure of other urgent matters prevented its consideration in the
Senate before the close of the session.
In the Seventy-seventh Congress a similar bill, S. 2221, was passed by the
Senate and was approved in substance by this committee. Previous to such ac-
tion, hearings were held before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 6463 and an earlier bill, H.R. 5373, both introduced by Representative
Celler.
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waiver of immunity.3
The discretionary function exception, as presently worded in
the Act, appeared for the first time in a 1942 bill.32 Hearings on that
bill are relevant in determining the intent of the exception since no
hearings were held on the 1946 Act. The testimony of one speaker"
at the 1942 hearings noted that the intent of the exception was to
prevent the use of the Act as an authorization for testing "the pro-
priety of a discretionary administrative act" through a damage suit
in tort. The inclusion of the exception within the Act sought to
mandate a court's normal exercise of restraint through judicial con-
struction to avoid invalidating legislation or discretionary adminis-
trative action.34 The restraint applied to acts when they formed the
basis of a suit in tort as well as when they were challenged in some
other way.
The House Report devoted only one paragraph to an attempt
to explain some of the boundaries of the exception." The report
contained a few specific examples of discretionary functions which
were intended to be excluded from the Act.3" The validity of such
discretionary acts could not be tested by a tort suit "even though
negligently performed and involving an abuse of discretion."37 The
House Report did note, however, that "common-law torts of em-
ployees of regulatory agencies" would not be excluded through the
exception "to the same extent as torts of nonregulatory agencies.""
31. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 (1953). Among the reservations were
activities of the SEC and in the area of collection of taxes.
32. Id. at 26 n.12, citing H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 2207, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1942).
33. The testimony was of then Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea.
34. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27 n.14 (1953), citing Hearings on H.R. 5373
and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1942).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1287, supra note 24, at 5-6.
36. Among the excluded activities were:
[Aluthorized activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project, where no
negligence on the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground
for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be
tortious, or that the statute or regulation authorizing the project was invalid ...
[Al claim against a regulatory agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission
or the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . whether or not negligence is
alleged to have been involved. ...
[Cilaims based upon an allegedly negligent exercise by the Treasury Depart-
ment of the blacklisting or freezing powers . ...
Id. For a discussion of this paragraph, see Note, The Discretionary Exception and Municipal
Tort Liability: A Reappraisal, 52 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1053 (1968).
37. H.R. REP. No. 1287, supra note 24, at 6.
38. Id.
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From these explicit examples of discretionary functions pro-
tected by the Act, it may be inferred that decisions of a broad and
general nature would not be a basis of liability. Congress, however,
has allowed the courts great leeway in interpreting the scope of
section 2680(a). In classifying these governmental decisions, courts
are faced with questions of degree. It should be of no surprise, there-
fore, that the decisions initially lacked consistency in the interpreta-
tion of the exemption. 9 Recently, however, federal courts have
tended to develop a more uniform approach toward the meaning of
the discretionary function exception and have thus reached results
more consistent with Congress' original intent.4"
III. INITIAL COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DISCRETIONARY
EXEMPTION
The leading case on the discretionary function exception is
Dalehite v. United States,4' a 4-3 opinion of the United States Su-
preme Court. Decided in 1953, the case arose out of the Texas City
disaster of 1947 in which fertilizers, containing combustible amon-
ium nitrate, exploded and burst into flames. The government had
controlled the manufacture of this fertilizer as part of an export
plan. The petitioners claimed that the government was negligent in
failing to warn those handling the fertilizer of its explosive propensi-
ties. When viewing the government's activities, the majority found
it unnecessary, apart from the instant case, to define precisely
where discretion ended.4"
It is enough to hold, as we do, that the "discretionary function
or duty" that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort Claim
Act includes more than the initiation of programs and activities.
It also includes determinations made by executives or
administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules
of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and deci-
sion there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordi-
nates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance
with official directions cannot be actionable.43
39. See section III infra.
40. See section IV infra.
41. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
42. Id. at 35.
43. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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The Court, in holding the government immune from liability,
emphasized that the acts which the district court had found to be
negligent "were all responsibly made at a planning rather than
operational level." 44 This statement has provided the springboard
for a large body of case law utilizing the "planning level" versus the
''operational level" dichotomy as the standard for interpreting the
scope of the discretionary function exception.
The Dalehite majority stressed the status of the government
decisionmaker rather than the nature of the decision made.
The acts found to have been negligent were thus performed under
the direction of a plan developed at a high level under a direct
delegation of plan-making authority from the apex of the Execu-
tive Department.45
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, did "not predicate
liability on any decision taken at 'Cabinet level' or any other high-
altitude thinking," but rather, on the "type of discretion which
government agencies exercise in regulating private individuals.''4
The dissent viewed the majority opinion as choosing
to fix an amorphous, all-inclusive meaning to the word, and then
to delimit the exception not by whether the act was discretionary
but by who exercised the discretion. The statute itself contains
not the vaguest intimation of such a test . . . .
The broad manner in which the Dalehite majority treated the
meaning of discretion has been interpreted as having been modi-
fied4" by subsequent Supreme Court opinions in Indian Towing Co.
v. United States49 and Rayonier, Inc. v. United States."
In Indian Towing recovery against the United States under the
Tort Claims Act was sought for damages to plaintiff's tugboat, al-
legedly caused by the negligence of the Coast Guard in the operation
of a lighthouse. The government conceded that the discretionary
function exception was not applicable to its activities in operating
44. Id. at 42.
45. Id. at 39-40.
46. Id. at 57, 58 n.12 (Jackson, Black & Frankfurter, J.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 58 n.12.
48: See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
841 (1967). Contra, Duncan v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (D.D.C. 1973).
49. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
50. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
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.a lighthouse. Instead, it contended that the section of the Act'
which imposed liability on the government "in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances" would exclude liability for the performance of "uniquely
government functions" which private persons do not perform."2
The Court found that no such distinction between municipal
and proprietary functions had been impliedly incorporated into the
Act. Once the government "undertakes to warn the public of a
danger and thereby induces reliance [it] must perform . . . [its]
'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner."" Thus, the government
may even be held responsible for lack of due care in undertakings
it was not obligated to assume in the first instance.
In Rayonier suit was brought against the United States seeking
to recover damages caused by the alleged negligence of Forest Serv-
ice employees in fire fighting. The Service had entered into an
agreement with the state to suppress any fires in an area of public
lands. The owners of the adjacent lands, aware of this contract,
relied on the Service to control and extinguish any fires in the area.
The Court, apparently reapplying the "good Samaritan" test, reaf-
firmed its position in Indian Towing and reinforced its limitation on
Dalehite regarding municipal and proprietary functions. "To the
extent that there was anything to the contrary in the Dalehite case
it was necessarily rejected by Indian Towing."54
Taken together, these cases have been viewed as limiting the
broad discretion permitted the government by Dalehite before the
imposition of liability. Thus, if a duty of care towards an individual
or a class of individuals is imposed on the government by law or is
voluntarily assumed, that duty of care must be discharged in a non-
negligent manner.
IV. MODERN APPROACH BY FEDERAL COURTS
A. Introduction
Several commentators recently have come to the conclusion
that the federal courts have interpreted and applied the discretion-
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
52. 350 U.S. at 64.
53. Id. at 64-65 (emphasis added).
54. 352 U.S. at 319 (footnote omitted).
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ary function exception in a confused and inconsistent manner.55
Most of these observations were based on comparisons between
some fairly recent cases and others decided in the aftermath of
Dalehite. For example, a leading 1953 decision, Harris v. United
States,"6 viewed the Dalehite interpretation of the discretionary
function exception in almost absolutist terms, immunizing a broad
range of discretionary acts from liability.57 Today, federal courts do
not view the exception as an all-encompassing provision which in-
cludes every discretionary act by a government official." Thus, a
comparison of current cases with certain cases in the 1950's would
reveal an inconsistency. Confusion may be compounded by the fact
that these older cases have not been overruled and consequently
remain viable as possible precedent.
It is submitted that courts today, although using a variety of
terminology,59 appear to be consistent in approach: when referring
to negligent acts, they examine the nature of the decision to deter-
mine whether the activity will be immunized at the "planning
level" or whether liability will attach at the "operational level." The
courts do vary in their holdings as to the effect of Indian Towing and
Rayonier on Dalehite's interpretation of the exception. 0 Yet agree-
ment exists that Dalehite did not establish an absolutist view which
would immunize a broad range of discretionary acts.
No "litmus paper" test can be developed for predicting which
activities will be shielded from liability. Since the courts are faced
with numerous types of governmental activities, they must, of ne-
55. 57 GEO. L.J., supra note 14, at 110; 2 CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV., supra note 14;
Comment, Inadequacies Of Federal Sovereign Immunity: A New Perspective, 61 GEO. L.J.
1535 (1973); Recent Developments, Discretionary Functions - The Planning - Operational
Dichotomy Revisited, 41 WASH. L. REV. 340 (1966).
56. 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953), cited in 57 GEO. L.J. supra note 14, at 108; and in 2
CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV., supra note 14, at 390.
57. Drawing an analogy to the immunized acts which the Supreme Court had catego-
rized as discretionary in Dalehite, the Tenth Circuit, in Harris, saw no distinction in the
decision to destroy willows and eradicate mosquitoes by the use of a chemical herbicide
sprayed from a plane. 205 F.2d at 766-67.
58. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967).
59. For instance, the terms policy and planning have been used interchangeably. In
addition, some court decisions have referred to "discretionary" vs. "ministerial" functions.
E.g., Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 910 (1976).
60. Compare Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967), with Maynard v. United States, 430 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1970).
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cessity, proceed on a case-by-case basis. Generalizations cannot eas-
ily be made, but certain common characteristics have evolved. In
each case, the judiciary should identify the determinative factors
which require classifying a decision as discretionary as opposed to
one with governmental interests which the exemption was not in-
tended to encompass.
In deciding whether to apply the exception, courts have gener-
ally adopted the usage of various criteria." Despite the varied
weight granted certain of these criteria, the courts have apparently
adopted their usage with the result of narrowing any possible inter-
pretation that Dalehite exempted all discretionary acts.
Modem cases make it clear that the absolutist interpretation
of the discretionary function exception taken by the Dalehite major-
ity has not been adopted." In order to fall within the scope of the
exception, it is not sufficient for the government to demonstrate
merely that some choice was part of the decisionmaking process."3
Rather, courts scrutinize the nature of the judgment to determine
whether a balancing of certain policy factors was involved.6" "Con-
gress intended 'discretionary functions' to encompass those activi-
ties which entail the formulation of governmental policy, whatever
the rank of those so engaged." 5 Thus, the federal courts have not
adopted the approach of focusing on the status of the decisionmaker
to determine the applicability of section 2680(a). Although not al-
ways expressly stating, the courts have analyzed the nature of the
decision itself to ascertain if the activity included the formulation
of policy.
Generally, courts have not defined the concept of discretion
which underlies section 2680(a). However, as the district court
noted in Swanson v. United,"6
[i]n a strict sense, every action of a government employee, ex-
cept perhaps a conditioned reflex action, involves the use of some
degree of discretion. The planning level notion refers to decisions
involving questions of policy, that is, the evaluation of factors
61. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
62. See, e.g., J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
63. Id.
64. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974).
65. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1975).
66. 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
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such as the financial, political, economic, and social effects of a
given plan or policy ...
The operations level decisions, on the other hand, involves
decisions relating to the normal day-by-day operations of the
government. Decisions made at this level may involve the exer-
cise of discretion but not the evaluation of policy factors. 7
Many of the recent federal court decisions have at least implicitly
incorporated several of these same factors in determining whether
policymaking functions had been exercised.
When confronted with governmental decisions requiring the
weighing of scientific factors, the judiciary has approached the
problem in a unique manner. Scientific determinations involve the
matching of objective facts. This is distinguished from a balancing
of competing policy considerations in determining the public inter-
est, which, on the other hand, merits subjective analysis. Thus,
scientific decisionmaking has been interpreted as the mere execu-
tion of policy judgments previously formulated. No discretion is
exercised, and hence the courts have not, generally, applied the
exception.6"
Similarly, activities on the operational level are not within the
purview of the discretionary function exception." Notwithstanding
the difficulty courts have experienced in discerning the precise div-
iding line between those activities at the operational level and those
at the planning level, operational tasks tend to involve the execution
of policy judgments rather than the forumulation of them. Thus,
once an activity has been chosen to be undertaken, performance
must not be done negligently. The failure to do so will result in the
imposition of liability since the exception will not apply. 0
B. Application of Discretionary Function Exception to Particular
Government Activities
It appears that recent federal cases have implicitly incorpo-
67. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added).
68. See section IV, B, 6 infra. But see Daniel v. United States, 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.
1970).
69. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 112-16 infra.
70. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); American Exchange Bank
v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958).
It should be noted, however, that abuse of discretion still is not actionable if the activity
is protected "policymaking" under section 2680(a). Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States
Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975).
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rated the policy factors enunciated in Swanson" as relevant in de-
termining the kind of discretion which the Federal Tort Claims Act
sought to immunize. Examination of the courts' application of sec-
tion 2680(a) to various types of governmental decisionmaking activ-
ities will reflect this proposition.
1. PROMULGATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Adopting rules and regulations is a protected activity under the
initial part of section 2680(a)72 "in the execution of a statute or
regulation." It is evident that criteria stated in Swanson are consid-
ered in the promulgation of or failure to promulgate regulations.
The decision whether to adopt regulations requires the considera-
tion of a wide range of policy factors, depending upon the particular
situation. The government's failure to promulgate a stricter set of
air safety regulations, 3 or the failure to formulate rules designed to
prevent the negligent discharge of firearms by National Guardsmen
during a riot, 4 illustrate instances where tort liability has not been
imposed for failure to promulgate rules deemed necessary by a pri-
vate litigant."5 The discretionary function exception, when so ap-
plied, acts to insulate the rulemaking functions of government and
thus succeeds in accomplishing what some courts have seen as one
of the Act's intended purposes-to allow a government decision-
maker the freedom to choose a course of action without the threat
of governmental liability lurking in the background."6
2. APPLICATION OF RULES, REGULATIONS, AND STATUTES
In contrast to the broad retention of sovereign immunity in
cases where regulations are initially promulgated, liability may be
imposed, under proper circumstances, in cases where the regula-
tions are applied by government employees. Generally, to determine
if liability may be imposed, courts must examine whether the stat-
ute or regulation in question contemplates the establishment of a
71. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
73. Miller v. United States, 522 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975).
74. Smith v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
75. See also Marr v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Okla. 1969).
76. See note 13 supra regarding these same considerations as being relevant in extending
individual immunity. See also Miller v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Ky. 1974),
aff'd, 522 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975).
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rule by an official for future government behavior as compared to
the mere application of an old, understood rule.77 In the first in-
stance, since the official is forced to rely upon factors such as those
enunciated in Swanson, the government will be immune from liabil-
ity. In the second situation, however, the official has been accorded
no such discretion. His blind adherence to the constraints of the rule
will amount to the type of enforcement which will immunize the
government. However, improper application of the regulation by
deviation from its constraints, for example, will result in the imposi-
tion of liability. Failure to follow guidelines will be considered an
operational activity.
The many cases decided by the federal courts clearly reflect
adherence to these general principles. In Downs v. United States,"5
the chief FBI agent on the, scene ordered his men to fire their guns
in order to disable a hijacked plane which had landed for refueling.
The hijacker responded by shooting two hostages. Suit was then
brought against the government. The Sixth Circuit, in upholding
recovery, held that the chief FBI agent's actions did not constitute
formulation of policy so as to fall within the exception. Prior to this
hijacking, the FBI had developed the policy to be employed in such
a situation.79 Thus, although the agent was called upon to use his
judgment in dealing with the hijacking, the judgment was not
of "the nature and quality" which Congress intended to put be-
yond judicial review. . . . Congress intended "discretionary
functions" to encompass those activities which entail the formu-
lation of governmental policy, whatever the rank of those so en-
gaged."0
Failure to follow FBI standard procedures was thus viewed as an
operational level decision.8 '
In contrast to the Downs situation, the regulation applied in
Kiiskila v. United States"2 called for an exercise of a different kind
77. Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
78. 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
79. The policy was set out in an FBI Handbook and in a secret memorandum issued
by the Departments of Justice and Transportation.
80. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1975).
81. See also Brown v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Ark. 1974) (where a federal
statute imposed upon the Bureau of Prisons a positive duty to provide suitable quarters,
recovery was allowed where plaintiff was injured because of overcrowded and understaffed
jails).
82. 466 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1972).
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of governmental discretion. The commanding officer of a military
base issued an order permanently excluding the plaintiff, a civilian
employee, from the base for an alleged violation of a fort regulation
against picketing, pamphletting, etc. Although the commander
could choose not to invoke the regulation, the decision whether to
apply it required discretion of the type contemplated by section
2680(a). The commander had to consider security, discipline, and
morale. The court therefore rejected a claim that the commander's
decision merely involved applying a clear rule to a clear factual
situation. 3
In cases involving the application of rules and regulations, cer-
tain governmental activities have consistently appeared in court
opinions throughout the years. One line of cases is centered around
the destruction which is unavoidably caused by sonic booms from
supersonic aircraft. These flights, authorized and conducted in ac-
cordance with the direction of the Strategic Air Command, are con-
sidered essential to the security of the nation. Making the decision
to fly these missions requires a political choice and hence is a pro-
tected discretionary function. 4 These flights, however, are flown
under the restrictions of Air Force regulations which control alti-
tude, route, speed, etc. 5 Thus, although the decision to make the
flights might be protected, any negligent deviation by a pilot from
his strict instructions can result in the imposition of liability upon
the government. 6
In another series, numerous cases were filed against the govern-
ment based upon the many different activities of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA). In Hoffman v. United States,"; the FAA
negligently failed to follow one of its own regulations requiring a
minimum amount of insurance as a condition to a plane owner's
83. Even abuse of discretion in these circumstances would be protected. See note 70
supra. See also Davis v. Federal Deposit Insur. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 277 (D. Colo. 1974)
(statute placed decision of what action to take with reference to a bank's allegedly unsound
practices in the FDIC's discretion).
84. Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972); Maynard v. United States,
430 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1970).
85. Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973); Abraham v. United States, 465
F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972); Nelms v. Laird, 442 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1971), rev 'd on other grounds,
406 U.S. 797 (1972).
86. Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973) (The court remanded the case
for the purpose of discovery in order to determine whether there was such operational negli-
gence).
87. 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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receiving an air taxi/commercial operator (ATCO) certificate. When
the plane subsequently crashed, the plaintiff sued the government
for damages. The FAA regulation presented clear standards to be
applied to specific fact situations involving determination of basic
eligibility for a certificate.88 Failure to adhere to this mandatory
insurance regulation involved no discretion-blind adherence being
required-and thus liability was imposed upon the government for
the negligent performance of an operational task."
Another series of cases involved the awarding or renewal of
government contracts. Many times, the particular government
agency will have specified certain guidelines to aid in determining
the awarding of a contract. The discretionary function exception
will protect the government in its discretion to promulgate such
rules." Similarly, no liability will be imposed unless the government
official negligently deviates from an existing standard which per-
mits the official no discretion in his decision.
In Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas,"' the FAA was re-
quired to decide whether the lowest bidder on a government con-
tract had complied with all the requirements of the bid. An FAA
procurement regulation mandated material compliance with all the
specifications in its invitation for bids before a contract could be
awarded.92 Another regulation, however, allowed for minor irregular-
ities in the bid and provided that the contract could be awarded
anyway. 3 The decision to treat one of the requirements of the bid
as a minor irregularity was a matter of choice for the FAA official.
Since no previous rule existed to direct a course of action, the degree
88. See text accompanying notes 141-42 infra.
89. Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See also Ingham v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) (FAA
directive not followed); Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1971), amended
and aff'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1972) (FAA manual); Sawyer v. United
States, 297 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1971) (knowingly
clearing two aircraft to land on the same runway at the same time violates civil air regula-
tions); Sullivan v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 411
F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1969) (FAA manual).
Another FAA case where regulations had not been followed did not involve a plane crash.
Duncan v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1167 (D.D.C. 1973) (FAA's failure to issue a medical
certificate to a pilot of a private airline pursuant to criteria established by regulation).
90. See section IV, B, 1 supra.
91. 521 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975),.cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910 (1976).
92. 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.301(a) (1975).
93. 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.405 (1975).
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of choice which the official could exercise was a protected decision
under section 2680(a).
In Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service," the
determination of whether to renew a contract with a star route car-
rier for transporting mail was considered a discretionary activity.
The Second Circuit, however, noted that the Postal Service, by
denying the carrier a hearing prior to what seemed to be a debar-
ment from a government contract, might have acted in violation of
one of its own regulations. 5 The official lacked discretion to
disregard regulations, and this point provided the grounds to distin-
guish this case from Scanwell Laboratories, in order that the exemp-
tion would not apply.
3. DECISIONS WITHIN THE INHERENT DISCRETION OF THE AGENCY
Courts have recognized that certain types of governmental deci-
sions are inherently within the discretion of the administrator.
Rather than interfere with the political process by allowing the pro-
priety of an agency decision to be tested by a tort action, courts have
noted that the Tort Claims Act was not intended to affect the distri-
bution of political responsibility. Thus, in Smith v. United
States,97 the Fifth Circuit held that the refusal of the Attorney Gen-
eral to bring suit for an alleged violation of a statute which forbade
harassment of a federal juror was within the absolute and inherent
discretion of the prosecutorial function. According to the court, the
exclusive responsibility for conducting litigation rests with the At-
torney General. He must weigh numerous factors, taking into ac-
count national policy, prosecutorial resources, and the circumstan-
ces of the particular case. Such policy decisions are committed to
the Executive by the Constitution and are protected governmental
activities since they affect the political interests of the nation.
The exception was also applied in Monarch Insurance Co. v.
District of Columbia." The United States was allegedly negligent in
its preparation and implementation of plans to suppress a riot and
protect against domestic violence. The government had delayed in
94. 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975).
95. 39 C.F.R. § 957 (1975).
96. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
97. Id.
98. 353 F. Supp. 1249 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd mer., 497 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
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sending troops and police into this affray. Extensive damage claims
resulting from the riot were paid by the plaintiff insurance com-
pany. Rejecting an allegation that the government lacked discretion
in its obligation to restore order and protect private property, the
district court found that policy considerations pervaded every phase
of planning and executing a riot control program.9 The court evi-
dently was of the opinion that social and political factors were in-
volved in the administrative decision. 00
At odds with Smith and Monarch Insurance is Swanner v.
United States.0' Section 2680(a) did not immunize from tort liabil-
ity the government's failure to provide police protection for Swan-
ner, a special IRS informer who was working in an undercover inves-
tigation of illicit whiskey operations. Swanner's house was bombed,
injuring him and several members of his family. Since the United
States was aware of the dangerous nature of the undercover work
and had knowledge of threats made about informers generally and
about Swanner specifically, the government owed him a special
duty of reasonable care in providing protection. Although not
elaborating as to why the failure to provide protection was not a
decision within the meaning of section 2680(a), the court cited In
re Guarler 2 for the proposition that a special duty was owed to
Swanner in these circumstances. From the establishment of a na-
tional government by the Constitution, a governmental duty arises
to protect citizens who inform on violations of the law from lawless
acts of violence. Once the government has a reasonable belief that
one of its employees is in danger as a result of performing his duties,
the duty to protect that employee exists without the necessity of a
formal request for protection. Apparently, the court found that a
special duty was owed to Swanner, unlike the general duty found
to be owed to the public as a whole in Smith. This special duty left
no room for the exercise of discretion, and therefore, failure to
provide protection was an operational activity. With reference to the
Swanson model on policymaking factors, the government's decision
99. Id. at 1258.
100. See also Redmond v. United States, 518 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (SEC
had discretion to maintain law and order in the securities field and had no duty to warn the
public about the background of securities dealers).
101. 309 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1970). This case was originally reported in 275 F.
Supp. 1007 (M.D. Ala. 1967) and reversed and ordered for new trial in 406 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.
1969).
102. 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
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to undertake an undercover investigation and the determinations of
the manner in which Swanner was to be employed required consid-
eration of political, social, and economic factors. Once the project
was begun, however, the government would not be protected from
negligence in proceeding with the operation by failing to provide
protection for its agents.
Section 2680(a) was found to apply to decisions by a committee
of officers of the Army National Guard and the Army General Staff
as to the training of a federalized state National Guard engaged in
quelling a riot.' °0 Although quoting Dalehite extensively and refer-
ring to the "very high level" of these officials, the court scrutinized
the nature of the decisionmaking function. The committee was obli-
gated to formulate policies and rules affecting training. Adopting
the methods and means for restoring order in a city faced with a riot
is a decision which the Constitution delegated to the executive
branch, not to the judiciary. Thus, this case rested on the court's
view of the proper distribution of governmental powers.
The discretionary exemption likewise was applied to protect
decisions by a State Department official which involved judgments
and discretion affecting foreign policy.' 4 In Four Star Aviation, Inc.
v. United States,0 5 the appellant mortgagee had repossessed an
airplane in Venezuela and flown it to Puerto Rico. The American
official-the head of the office of Caribbean affairs-had not ob-
jected to returning the plane to Venezuela upon inquiry from the
Puerto Rican Secretary of State. The appellant sought to recover
the value of the plane for this allegedly negligent decision by the
United States official. The court denied recovery since the political
and international factors which confronted the decisionmaker were
within his protected domain.
In United States v. Carson,'0 allegedly negligent advice ren-
dered by the Farmer's Home Administration (FHA) was held to be
a protected discretionary decision under the exception. In this ac-
tion, the FHA sued on two notes owed by the defendants, and the
defendants counterclaimed under the Tort Claims Act. Having
loaned money to the defendants for planting and maintaining a
citrus grove, the FHA advised plaintiffs about agricultural practices
103. Smith v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
104. Four Star Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1969).
105. Id.
106. 360 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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necessary to keep the citrus trees which had survived a severe frost
alive. This advice was given even though the FHA knew that most
of the trees were already dead. Rather than finding the FHA's activ-
ity a negligent performance of operational tasks, the court recog-
nized that, as a lender, the FHA had a right to protect its security
interest. The manner of accomplishing this result was within its
discretion. The court did not elaborate on the considerations which
rendered this activity discretionary. Apparently financial, eco-
nomic, and social factors were relevant to the nature of the advice
which itself was inherently within the discretion of the agency. 07
Agency decisions to award contracts to bidders on the basis of
various criteria have been found to be within the ambit of the excep-
tion. 08 In Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, " ' the
Postal Service had discretion to renew contracts of its star route
carriers for transporting mail. An award of these contracts involved
numerous policy factors including the contractor's past perform-
ance, the nature of the routes, the needs of the postal users, due
consideration of the public interest, and the cost of the transporta-
tion service. Furthermore, obtaining contracts for small businesses
by government agencies was found to be a discretionary matter for
administrators of the Small Business Administration. Thus, re-
covery on grounds of discrimination was precluded." 0
Internal housekeeping decisions may also be found to be within
the inherent discretion of an agency. In J.H. Rutter Rex Manufac-
107. See also Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973) (the Warren Commis-
sion, given a broad mandate to investigate pursuant to an Executive Order, could decide
whether to publish the writings of the alleged presidential assassin and the United States
could not be liable in tort for infringement of common law copyright); United States v.
Gregory Park, Section II, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1974) (where HUD was allegedly
negligent in administering its projects, the discretionary function exception applied);
McGarry v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 525 (D. Nev. 1973) (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
is exercising its discretion at the highest planning level in determining the extent to which it
will undertake to supervise the safety procedures of private contractors who operate and
maintain nuclear testing facilities; therefore the exception applied); Mims v. United States,
349 F. Supp. 839 (W.D. V. 1972) (U.S. negligently assuming ownership of land was exercising
protected discretion); Boruski v. Division of Corp. Finance, 321 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (the SEC's withholding of registration approval is within the exception).
108. Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975);
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 910 (1976); Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
960 (1969).
109. 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975).
110. See also People's Brewing Co. v. Kleppe, 360 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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turing Co. v. United States,"' the Fifth Circuit applied the excep-
tion to immunize the National Labor Relations Board's decision
with regard to distributing its workload at an understaffed office. An
inexperienced officer had been assigned to work on this company's
situation. He was instructed to handle less complicated matters first
in order to gain experience. This decision resulted in a 4-year delay
in the NLRB's filing of initial back pay specifications against this
employer. The court held, however, that the NLRB decision to es-
tablish priorities in carrying out its past orders required a balancing
of cost-benefit considerations to advance the public interest and
hence constituted a policymaking determination.
Courts, however, have indicated that the United States would
be liable for negligence where certain administrative decisions were
''operational in character" particularly when the decision was for
execution and not formulation of policy. Decisions involving the day
and hour of test firing of a rocket and the amount of thrust to be
developed by the rocket engines did not require the kind of discre-
tion within the exception so as to insulate the government from tort
liability."2 The court examined the nature of the decision and re-
jected any absolutist interpretation of Dalehite, but it gave no indi-
cation as to why these particular decisions were on the operational
and not the planning level. Social, political, and economic factors
were not under consideration here since the initial decision to fire a
test rocket, which demanded policy considerations, was not at issue.
"[O]nce the government has exercised its discretion and has de-
cided to proceed in a matter, then the government is liable for
negligent acts done in the course of such proceedings.""'
The government is under no duty to provide certain types of
services to the public. But once it has exercised its inherent discre-
tion through an initial policy decision to undertake the service,
future decisions are deemed operational. In Sullivan v. United
States,"' the United States undertook to provide vital information
111. 515 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1975).
112. Pigott v. United States, 451 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1971).
113. S. Schonfeld Co. v. SS Akra Tenaron, 363 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (D.S.C. 1973) (tort
claim was not barred by discretionary function exception for the negligent handling of cargo
by a government agent after the cargo had been lawfully detained).
114. 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
115. See also Chanon v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd on other
grounds, 480 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (the government had to exercise due care
in gathering weather information although there was no liability in this case since no negli-
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to airplane pilots indicating the lighting conditions and procedures
at airfields at night. Thus, the preparing and circulating of the
charts were seen as operational tagkg. The government could not
claim immunity under the exception for injuries sustained as a re-
sult of the crash of an aircraft which was attempting to land at an
unlit airfield when a chart had stated otherwise." 5
The manner of conducting an investigation by the FBI might
be subjected to recovery under the Tort Claims Act. In Porter v.
United States,"' since there was no allegation of negligence, the
Fifth Circuit denied recovery for the staining and discoloration of
some documents handled by the FBI during their statutorily author-
ized investigation. The court left open the question of recovery for
damage to property during an investigation where negligence was
demonstrated. A court would have to scrutinize the nature of the
discretion exercised and ascertain the point where the negligent act
had occurred. Thus, it would seem that if an agent misplaced an
article or accidentally dropped and damaged it, the actions would
be operational.
These cases illustrate the proposition that courts will scrutinize
the nature of the decisions made by government officials in order
to ascertain whether the activity is inherently within the agency's
discretion. If the agency decision requires a consideration of the
Swanson criteria, the exception will be applied.
4. PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS
The government, in choosing to undertake numerous public
works projects, may injure innocent third parties in some situations.
Frequently, the individuals involved seek recovery against the gov-
ernment. To prevent the threat of liability, the exception acts to
immunize the government in certain of these circumstances.
The initial decision to undertake a public works project is pro-
tected from the imposition of liability since the discretionary ex-
emption clearly was intended to apply in such a situation. Once the
decision to undertake the project is made, however, the design cho-
sen and the details or methods of carrying out the plan may be a
gence was demonstrated); Logue v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 459 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 412
U.S. 521 (1973) (once the decision to transfer a prisoner was made, the deputy marshall had
a duty to take reasonable precautions at the jail to protect the prisoner).
116. 473 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973).
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protected governmental function if it requires the type of policy-
making contemplated by section 2680(a). If no choices are involved,
once the government chooses to undertake a project, it must do so
with due care. A negligent act may lead to the imposition of liability
upon the government.
The Tenth Circuit, in Spillway Marina, Inc. v. United States,"7
held that the choice by the Army Corps of Engineers whether to
release or store water in a reservoir which was part of a flood control
system depended upon variable factors such as navigation condi-
tions and needs, irrigation requirements, and rainfall. Therefore, no
action could be maintained for the inevitable damages resulting
from the lowering of the water level."' Similarly, in another case,
the decision of the Secretary of the Army to cause the dredging of a
river was a discretionary act within the meaning of section
2680(a). 119
If, after the initial decision to undertake a project has been
made, the government officials must balance various policy factors
in approving the design, such governmental activity will be pro-
tected also. In approving the design plans for an interstate highway
submitted by a state, the Secretary of Commerce must decide if
they are adequate to meet traffic needs. In Daniel v. United
States,2 0 the approval of the plans and specifications involved the
balancing of several policy oriented criteria, as mandated by stat-
ute,' 2' including safety, durability, and maintenance.' 2 Conse-
quently, "when an official is authorized to weigh potentially con-
flicting considerations in arriving at a decision, such decisions fall
squarely within the discretionary exception."'2 3
When the design aspect of a government project does not relate
to policymaking activities, the activity will be considered opera-
tional. In Stanley v. United States,' the decedent fell while paint-
117. 445 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1971).
118. York Cove Corp. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 799 (E.D. Va. 1970).
119. Boston Edison Co. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 423 F.2d 891 (1st Cir. 1970).
120. 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1970).
121. 23 U.S.C. § 109(a), (b) (1970).
122. See also Delgadillo v. Elledge, 337 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Dolphin Gardens,
Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
123. In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 381 F. Supp. 931, 968-69 (S.D.W. Va. 1974)
(dictum).
124. 347 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Me. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 476 F.2d 606 (1st Cir.
1973).
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ing a naval radio tower because of the absence of guard rails. Since
the evidence did not show that the railings would have interfered
with the electronic performance of the tower, no competing policy
considerations existed. The deletions were thus considered as being
at the operational level.
In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. United States,'25 though the
government's decision to construct a drainage ditch was a policy
judgment, the government was required to exercise due care in per-
forming the task. Once the decision was made, the government was
no longer exercising a discretionary, policymaking function. The
operational function of building the drainage ditch had to be per-
formed in a non-negligent manner. 2"
The court distinguished the case from Daniel by stating that in
Daniel there had been no allegation that the plans and specifica-
tions were prepared by the government, that its construction was
performed by the government, or that the highway was owned or
controlled by the government.'27 In reality, the distinguishing factor
was that the construction of the ditch did not require the weighing
of any policymaking criteria.
In Driscoll v. United States,2 ' a base civil engineer had under-
taken to provide traffic control services at the base but chose not to
install traffic control devices at the scene of a subsequent accident.
On appeal from the granting of summary judgment, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the decision could not be deemed operational as a
matter of law. On remand, the district court was required to deter-
mine whether the engineer's decision as to the design of the traffic
control system involved the weighing of policy criteria. Only after
this determination was made would the question of negligence be
considered.
5. ISSUANCE OF LICENSES AND CERTIFICATES
Courts have distinguished various types of license and certifica-
125. 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
126. Id., citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See also Moyer
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973) (acceptance of an aircraft with a
negligently designed pilot's ejection seat is not immune under the exception). This case was
criticized in Clark, Discretionary Function and Official Immunity: Judicial Forays into Sanc-
tuaries from Tort Liability, 16 AIR FORcE L. REV. 33 (Spring 1974).
127. 473 F.2d at 717 n.2.
128. 525 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1975).
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tion cases based on whether the issuance of the license depended on
weighing several policy criteria or whether the issuance was deter-
mined by clear, previously established standards.
[W]here ...the grant or refusal to grant [a license] is made
without reliance upon any readily ascertainable rule or standard,
the courts will hold the judgment discretionary. . . . [But]
where the grant involves nothing more than the matching of facts
against a clear rule or standard, the grant will be considered
operational and not discretionary."
Although no litmus paper test has been proposed, several fac-
tors become relevant in cases involving issuance of certificates and
licenses.
[Ilt is pertinent to inquire whether the complaint attacks on the
one hand the nature of rules which a government agency has
formulated, or on the other hand the way in which these rules are
applied. 3
Taxay v. United States,3' for example, concerned the refusal by the
"Regional Flight Surgeon, as affirmed by the Federal Air Surgeon
and the Federal Aviation Administrator"'' 31 to renew plaintiff's des-
ignation as an Aviation Medical Examiner. The applicable statute
granted the Administrator the authority to "delegate to any pro-
perly qualified private person" any of the functions relating to the
testing required for the issuance of certificates.'3 3 This power was
one step in the process of the administrator's determination of the
requisites for achieving air commerce safety. Pursuant to regula-
tion,'3M decisions for reappointing doctors were within the complete
discretion of the Administrator, and of those to whom the Adminis-
trator delegated such discretion. As the Administrator, through his
delegate, had acted within this framework, no violation of plaintiff's
rights had occurred which could be asserted under the Tort Claims
Act. The placing of personnel to carry out the intent of the statute
to assure air safety was executed at the planning level of governmen-
tal activity. Furthermore, the determination of the qualifications of
129. Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 782 (2d Cir. 1969).
130. Id.
131. 345 F. Supp. 1284 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. Id. at 1285.
133. 49 U.S.C. § 1355(a) (1970).
134. 14 C.F.R. § 183.15(c) (1976).
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physicians as aviation medical examiners was within the sole discre-
tion of the Administrator.
Similarly, in Coastwise Packet Co. v. United States,"5 the
Coast Guard's initial failure to issue a certificate of inspection for a
schooner was a discretionary activity within the exception. Such a
certificate was required before the ship could carry passengers for
hire. The alleged negligence of the Coast Guard in applying various
safety standards was not the type of activity for which Congress had
intended to hold the government liable in tort. The First Circuit
noted that in this case the decisions were not based on
single, known, objective standard which, because of administra-
tive negligence, the Coast Guard failed to apply. . . . When no
standard exists, then the process of certifying, insofar as it in-
volves groping for a standard, is within the discretionary exemp-
tion of the Act."'
Thus, the Coast Guard had discretion in formulating standards for
inspection in order to fulfill its statutory duty to promote safety., 7
The court distinguished between the types of certification cases and
found only some to be within the discretionary function exception.
The exception was deemed inapplicable in Hendry v. United
States3' where the decision to withhold a seaman's license was pred-
icated on professional medical judgments rather than public policy
factors. The delicensing procedure did not convey discretion to the
doctor "to identify and consider public safety goals. The only discre-
tion apparently contemplated was that inherent in the judgments
of any medical doctor in private pratice."'13 These judgments are
commonly ruled upon by the courts in tort suits against private
physicians.
Similarly, in Duncan v. United States,110 the Federal Air Sur-
geon's refusal to reissue an airman's medical certificate, as affirmed
by the FAA administrator, was held to be an operational activity.
The Regulations had established clear medical standards. If the
135. 398 F.2d 77 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968).
136. Id. at 79.
137. See also Hooper v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Conn. 1971) (granting of
permit to construct a power station was a discretionary act of the Army Corps of Engineers).
138. 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969). For a further explanation of the distinction between
certain professional judgments and policymaking, see section IV, B, 6 infra.
139. Id.
140. 355 F. Supp. 1167 (D.D.C. 1973).
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applicant matched these criteria, the administrator had no discre-
tion to deny the certificate.
In Hoffman v. United States,"' the issuance of an ATCO certifi-
cate to an aircraft company was not immune under section 2680(a)
from a tort suit. The granting of an ATCO certificate depended on
certain conclusive standards which were required by regulations."'
Since the issuance of the certificate depended on clear standards,
failure of the FAA to follow its own regulations was considered oper-
ational since no discretion could be exercised. Because the ATCO
certificate was issued to an airline for a plane which subsequently
craghed, the injured passengers could be compensated by suing the
government.
6. EXPERT EVALUATIONS
Governmental decisions encompassing expert evaluations are
not always within the ambit of the exception. In the area of scien-
tific and medical judgments, for instance, controversy exists as to
whether the exception will apply.
The lines of conflict are drawn in Griffin v. United States.'
The Division of Biologic Standards (DBS), a division of HEW, ap-
proved a particular lot of polio vaccine for release to the public. The
injured party contended that the DBS had failed to comply with
standards established by the Surgeon General as to the effect of the
vaccine on the central nervous system. DBS judged the vaccine's
effect by making scientific evaluations of five criteria. Rejecting a
claim of immunity under section 2680(a), the court held that the
judgment by DBS in making scientific measurements were those of
a professional and
not that of a policy-maker promulgating regulations by balancing
competing policy considerations in determining the public inter-
est. Neither was it a policy planning decision nor a determination
of the feasibility or practicability of a government program.'
141. 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
142. 14 C.F.R. § 135.15 (1976), an FAA regulation, requires that an ATCO certificate
cannot be issued unless the airline holds CAB economic authority. A CAB regulation, man-
dates that CAB economic authority cannot be conveyed unless the requisite liability insur-
ance is carried by the airline. 14 C.F.R. § 298.42(a)(1) (1974).
143. 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
144. Id. at 1066. This decision was based largely on language found in Hendry v. United
States, 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
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The mere fact that the agency evaluated several factors in making
its decision did not necessarily invoke section 2680(a), especially
where the judgments were those of a professional and not those of a
policymaker.
The Griffin dissent, however, claimed that the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment in this case required policy decisions as to the
amount of weight to be accorded each of five factors."5 In his dis-
senting opinion, Judge Van Dusen could find no distinction between
these scientific activities and those found immune from liability by
the Dalehite majority.14 6
The logical extension of the dissenting opinion would in effect
revitalize the absolutist approach adopted by Dalehite, exempting
all discretionary governmental activities from liability. It is submit-
ted that even though the DBS exercised some choice, this was insuf-
ficient to invoke section 2680(a). The nature of the decision should
be controlling. Whether policymaking has been exercised involves
the weighing of political, social, and economic factors. Policymaking
should not be equated with mere scientific judgments which a court
is fully capable of scrutinizing. Scientific judgments often relate to
objective facts, processes, and conclusions which are subject to
court review. Courts should not be allowed to second-guess policy-
makers who must weigh subjective criteria affecting public policy.
The application of the exception to the policymaking situation pre-
vents this type of interference.'47
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset, it is important to keep in mind that one of the
basic purposes of the Act-and more specifically of the exception
itself-is to allow a government official the freedom to choose a
course of conduct without the threat of governmental liability lurk-
ing in the background.' Initial decisions placed emphasis on the
145. 500 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1974) (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
146. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
147. See Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969); Duncan v. United States,
355 F. Supp. 1167 (D.D.C. 1973).
148. In order to define the limits of discretionary immunity it is helpful to refer to the
primary reasons advanced for the existence of the Tort Claims Act. One commentator has
noted three principal reasons for the continuance of discretionary immunity:
[11 such immunity promotes the separation of powers which is one of our con-
stitutional keystones. . ..
[21 [iun areas of policymaking, courts are not organized to investigate and
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wrong element in the stated purpose. The Dalehite majority focused
on the decisionmaker; thus, leading to a subconscious interpretation
that any decision by a governmental official vested with some au-
thority or status would immunize the government from a suit in
tort. In effect, the Federal Tort Claims Act would have been ren-
dered a nullity had this interpretation been allowed to stand.
Subsequent decisions have come to grips with this dilemma and
have recognized that most conscious acts of persons involve some
degree of choice. The "nature and quality of the discretion"'49 in
question has now become the focus for discussion. It appears that
each decision on whether to immunize the government will be de-
cided on its own facts. Certain factors or situations are discernable,
however, in coming to a clearer understanding of the situation and
as a greater aid to prediction.
If the decision can be viewed as emanating from the planning
level, immunity exists. The planning aspects are synonymous with
policy considerations such as financial, political, economic, and so-
cial effects.'50 This is readily distinguishable from operational or
day-to-day activities where immunity would not exist.
As a further clarification, some acts are clearly within the ex-
emption. Matters dealing with foreign policy are presumptively
immune. Inherent discretion is also seen as being within prosecu-
tional agencies.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are decisions that are
clearly subject to liability if performance causes damage. Depart-
mental decisions arrived at on the basis of clear and readily avail-
able standards or guidelines that had previously been set offer a
good example. It is the in-between or gray area where various factors
become important.
It is submitted that those commentators who view the discre-
tionary function exception as a confusing exercise in judicial incon-
sistancies are incorrect in their appraisal of the situation. By focus-
ing on a trend, with due regard to the original intent of Congress,, ' ,
weigh all the factors which enter into the decisions of other branches. . . .[and]
(3] [to prevent] enormous and unpredictable liability which could result from
judicial reexamination of major executive and legislative decisions.
Reynolds, supra note 14, at 121-23.
149. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967).
150. Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
151. Recent discussions before Congress concerning proposed amendments to the Fed-
1976]
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it is readily apparent that later decisions, which look to the type of
decision rather than the decisionmaker, have laid down a reasona-
bly clear framework for analyzing various acts. This approach ap-
pears to have carried forth the original intent of Congress.
eral Tort Claims Act have been aimed at limiting the intentional tort immunity. No dissatis-
faction with the discretionary function exception was apparent. Smith, Statement on H.R.
10439 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary by the Chairman of the Tort Law
Committee of the Federal Bar Association, March 27, 1974, 34 FED. B.J. 79 (1975).
